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Abstract	
	
This	study	of	English	Coronial	practice	raises	a	number	of	questions,	not	only	regarding	
state	 investigations	 of	 suicide,	 but	 also	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Coroner	 itself.	 	 Following	
observations	at	over	20	inquests	into	possible	suicides,	and	in‐depth	interviews	with	six	
Coroners,	 three	main	 issue	emerged:	 first,	 there	exists	 considerable	 slippage	between	
different	Coroners	over	which	deaths	are	 likely	 to	be	classified	as	suicide;	second,	 the	
high	standard	of	proof	required,	and	immense	pressure	faced	by	Coroners	from	family	
members	 at	 inquest	 to	 reach	 any	verdict	 other	 than	 suicide,	 can	 significantly	depress	
likely	 suicide	 rates;	 and	 finally,	 Coroners	 feel	 no	 professional	 obligation,	 either	
individually	 or	 collectively,	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 production	 of	 consistent	 and	 useful	
social	 data	 regarding	 suicide—arguably	 rendering	 comparative	 suicide	 statistics	
relatively	worthless.		These	issues	lead,	ultimately,	to	a	more	important	question	about	
the	role	we	expect	Coroners	to	play	within	social	governance,	and	within	an	effective,	
contemporary	democracy.	
	
	
Introduction	–	the	Coronial	Gate‐keeping	of	Suicide	Statistics	
	
Much	is	often	made	of	changes	in	our	suicide	rates.			As	a	society,	we	are	relieve	when	
we	 are	 informed	 that	 fewer	 people	 are	 ending	 their	 own	 lives	 (Australian	 Bureau	 of	
Statistics,	2012),	confused	when	we	are	told	exactly	 the	opposite	(Haesler,	2010),	and	
concerned	 when	 our	 own	 rates	 are	 compared	 unfavourably	 with	 other	 nations	 and	
peoples	(Georgatos,	2013).		It	is	often	difficult	to	ascertain	the	precise	trajectory	of	our	
suicide	rates,	let	alone	where	we	stand	in	relation	to	anyone	else.			
	
The	difficulty	here	is	that	suicide	statistics	are	notoriously	unreliable.		Most	research	in	
the	area	estimates	that	suicide	is	significantly	more	common	than	our	statistics	would	
have	us	believe	(Harrison,	Abou	Elnour,	&	Pointer,	2009).		This	systemic	under‐counting	
may	be	for	a	range	of	reasons.	 	Walker,	Chen	and	Madden	(2008)	contend	that	factors	
such	 as	 disparities	 between	 jurisdictions,	 lack	 of	 standardisation	 in	 the	 reporting	 of	
Coronial	deaths,	and	issues	over	forms	for	police	reports	contribute	to	 inaccuracies	in	
the	coding	of	our	data.	 	They	also	point	to	the	reluctance	of	some	Coroners	to	reach	a	
finding	of	suicide	 in	 the	 first	place.	 	 It	 is	 this	 final	 factor	which	 forms	the	 focus	of	 this	
paper.	
	
The	 central	 role	 of	 the	 Coroner	 has	 always	 been	 to	 investigate	 deaths	 ‘considered	
worthy	 of	 inquiry’	 (Burney,	 2000,	 p.	 3).	 	 This	would	 include	 deaths	 such	 as	 those	 by	
accident,	where	 there	was	 some	 suspicion	of	wrongdoing,	 and	 those	by	 suicide.	 	This	
became	 seen	 as	 a	 largely	 administrative	 task,	 conducted	 in	 a	 non‐adversarial	
environment,	 as	 part	 of	 the	 effective	 administration	 of	 the	 populace.	 	 However,	 in	
addition	 to	 the	 recording,	 assessing	 and	 categorizing	 of	 death,	 the	 Coroner’s	 role	 has	
more	recently	expanded	to	incorporate	elements	of	social	management	and	prevention	
of	harm	(The	Victorian	Institute	of	Forensic	Medicine,	2013)				
	
Much	of	the	operation	of	the	office	of	Coroner	or	Coroners	courts	in	Australia	is	centered	on	
injury	and	death	prevention,	with	 the	Coroner	empowered	to	make	recommendations	on	
matters	of	public	health	and	safety	and	judicial	administration.	
	
Consequently,	the	Coroner	is	not	only	an	essential	part	of	our	legal	system—in	that	they	
manage	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 State,	 and	 the	 death	 of	 its	 citizens,	 and	 in	
particular,	 those	 deaths	 deemed	 to	 warrant	 investigation—now	 they	 are	 also	 an	
important	 element	 of	 the	 process	 by	 which	 the	 State	 accumulates	 social	 data,	 data	
which	 is	 used	 to	 identify	 problems	 and	 shape	 policy.	 	 The	 problem	 here	 is	 clear:	 if	
Coroners	are	reluctant	to	reach	a	finding	of	suicide,	as	Walker,	Chen	and	Madden	(2008)	
contend,	 then	 their	 role	 in	 production	 of	 valid	 statistics,	 which	 in	 turn	 direct	 social	
policies	 and	 programs	 (targeting,	 for	 example,	 suicide	 prevention),	 becomes	
significantly	compromised.						
	
Democracy	and	the	Coronial	Inquest	
	
This	research	seeks	to	investigate	the	English	and	Welsh	Coronial	Inquest,	particularly	
as	it	relates	to	the	accurate	investigation	of	potential	suicides.		In	doing	so,	it	also	seeks	
to	make	some	comparisons	with	how	similar	deaths	are	managed	in	Australia.					There	
are	a	number	of	important	differences	between	the	two	systems.		The	most	significant	
concerns	 the	 role	 played	 by	 the	 inquest.	 	 In	 England	 and	 Wales,	 all	 deaths	 that	 are	
considered	worthy	of	 inquiry—which	 includes	potential	 suicides—are	necessarily	 the	
subject	 of	 a	 public	 inquest.	 	 In	 Australia,	 the	 same	 deaths	 are	 assessed	 solely	 on	 the	
basis	of	the	documentary	evidence,	unless	specific	circumstances	dictate	otherwise.			
	
It	is	important	to	note	that	the	role	of	the	Coroner,	and	the	functioning	of	the	Coronial	
Inquest,	 is	not	 just	matters	of	abstract	 social	 and	administrative	 interest.	 	 It	has	been	
argued	that,	historically,	both	are	central	to	how	English	democracy	came	to	be	shaped	
and	understood,	and	as	such,	questions	about	how	well	the	Coronial	system	works,	and	
about	how	different	former	British	colonies	have	chosen	to	refract	this	original	office	for	
their	own	purposes,	continue	to	be	asked.			
	
In	Bodies	of	Evidence,	Burney	(2000)	examines	the	historical	role	played	by	the	public	
inquest	in	placing	important	checks	on	State	abuse	of	power,	by	insisting	that	all	prison	
deaths—and	 most	 famously,	 the	 deaths	 of	 18	 protesting	 workers	 killed	 by	 in	 the	
Peterloo	 Massacre	 in	 1819—face	 public	 scrutiny	 and	 judgment.	 	 This	 notion,	 that	
questionable	deaths	be	the	subject	of	public	investigation,	an	investigation	accessible	to,	
and	readily	understood	by,	all	interested	parties	within	the	community,	became	central	
to	 English	 conceptions	 of	 justice	 and	 democracy.	 	 Indeed,	 much	 of	 Burney’s	 book	
examines	 the	 complex	 tension	 that	 arose	 within	 the	 Coronial	 Inquest,	 between	 the	
voices	of	this	participatory	tradition,	and	the	bearers	of	new,	scientific	knowledge	that	
sought	to	bring	medical	expertise	to	the	Inquest	process,	often	at	the	expense	of	public	
understanding	and	involvement.	
	
‘…the	benefit	of	expert	governance,	particularly	 in	an	era	of	mass	democracy,	was	 that	 it	
could	 draw	upon	 advanced,	 universalizing	 knowledge	 in	 the	 service	 of	 public	well‐being	
and,	ultimately,	public	education.		Its	shortcomings,	however,	lay	in	its	tendency	to	stifle	the	
very	instruments	of	civic	education—the	local,	participatory	institutions	in	which	an	active,	
informed,	and	morally	elevated	citizenry	was	forged.’	(Burney,	2000,	9)		
				
Arguably,	this	tension—or	at	least	a	modern	variant	on	it	(ie.	between	medicine	and	the	
law)—can	 still	 be	 clearly	 seen	within	 the	 fabric	 of	 contemporary	 death	 investigation	
(Carpenter	&	Tait,	2010).		Certainly,	there	was	some	expectation	that	this	tension	would	
be	evidenced	within	this	study,	and	there	were	some	minor	examples	of	this.		However,	
what	was	uncovered	was	a	far	more	significant	tension,	a	tension	between	the	pastoral	
and	 the	 governmental	 functions	 of	 the	 Coroner;	 between	 what	 appears	 to	 be	 a	
therapeutic	 role	 (in	 looking	 after	 the	 well‐being	 of	 bereaved	 families),	 and	 an	
investigative	and	preventative	role	(investigative,	 in	delivering	an	appropriate	finding,	
and	preventative,	in	contributing	accurate	data	to	inform	social	policy).		This	paper	will	
address	this	specific	issue	in	some	detail.		
	
Coronial	Inquests	and	Interviews	
	
This	 study	 was	 conducted	 within	 one	 geographic	 area	 in	 England.	 	 The	 Research	
consisted	 of	 observations	 made	 at	 twenty	 public	 inquests	 into	 possible	 suicides,	
followed	 by	 hour‐long,	 semi‐structured	 interviews	 with	 six	 of	 the	 coroners	 who	 had	
presided	over	the	above	inquests.	
	
From	the	observations	made	at	inquest,	three	relevant	conclusions	were	drawn.	 	First,	
there	appears	 to	be	no	single	model	 for	running	a	Coronial	 inquest.	 	Far	 from	being	a	
uniform	and	consistent	element	of	the	English	legal	system,	the	Coronial	Inquest	takes	a	
wide	 range	 of	 different	 forms.	 	 Though	 the	 Coroners	 are	 uniformally	 professional,	
patient,	and	skilled	at	managing	grieving	families,	each	Coroner	seems	to	organise	their	
own	 courtrooms	 as	 they	 see	 fit.	 	 Second,	 to	 be	 able	 to	 reach	 a	 finding	 of	 suicide,	 the	
standard	of	proof	is	extremely	high.		In	England,	suicide	determination	is	based	around	
the	criminal	 standard	of	 ‘beyond	reasonable	doubt’,	 rather	 than	 the	Australian	model,	
which	 has	 adopted	 the	 civil	 standard	 of	 ‘on	 the	 balance	 of	 probabilities’.	 	 Finally,	 the	
Coroners	are	often	placed	under	significant	pressure	throughout	the	proceedings	by	the	
deceased’s	family	not	to	bring	in	a	finding	of	suicide.	 	Almost	all	inquests	are	attended	
by	family	members,	and	even	where	they	appear	inclined	to	accept	a	finding	of	suicide,	
attempts	are	still	continually	made	to	control	the	general	narrative.	
	
From	interviews	with	Coroners,	four	further	issues	emerge,	issues	which	are	both	tied	
to	 the	 above	 observations,	 but	which	 also	 raise	 some	 important	 questions	 about	 just	
what	is	going	on	in	Coronial	suicide	investigations:	
	
Inconsistency	between	Coroners	
First,	there	exists	considerable	slippage	between	different	Coroners	as	to	what	is	likely	
to	be	considered	suicide,	and	what	is	not.		There	are	likely	to	be	a	number	of	reasons	for	
this.	 	As	mentioned	previously,	 there	has	always	been	a	tension	within	Coronial	death	
investigations	 between	 those	 who	 regard	 the	 process	 as	 a	 useful	 application	 of	 the	
scientific	 quest	 for	 truth—often	 exemplified	 by	 a	 different	 approach	 to	 the	 use	 of	
invasive	 autopsy—and	 those	 who	 place	 far	 more	 weight	 upon	 legal	 processes,	 and	
information	 gathered	 at	 the	 scene	 of	 death.	 	 This	 tension	 extends	 to	 disagreement	 of	
who	ought,	and	who	ought	not,	be	eligible	to	be	a	Coroner:			
	
‘I	have	nothing	against	my	medical	colleagues,	but	 I	do	think	 it’s	a	 job	 for	a	 lawyer	…	 I	think	
that	Inquest	law	is	now	becoming	so	complex—it’s	nothing	to	do	with	intellectual	ability,	but	I	
think	you	need	 legal	 training,	and	 to	have	performed	 in	 the	court	system	 to	really	be	able	 to	
deal	with	it.’		Coroner	4	
	
A	 further	 reason	 for	 a	 seeming	 lack	 of	 consistency	 in	 reaching	 findings	 of	 suicide	
involves	 considerable	 differences	 in	 experience,	 ability,	 and	 levels	 of	 training	 of	
Coroners.			
	
‘When	 I	 started,	 there	 was	 no	 training	 whatsoever	 for	 Coroners	 …	 the	 Coroner	 Society	 of	
England	and	Wales	established	 some	 training	 for	Coroners;	 it	was	pretty	 limited	with	a	very	
small	budget.		There’s	no	requirement	for	us	to	have	that	training	…	so	there	is	inevitably	a	lack	
of	consistency,	and	there	are	some	people	who	do	not	go	on	any	training	at	all.’		Coroner	2	
	
There	 are	 also	 variations	 in	 funding	 and	 responsibilities.	 Some	 Coroners	 are	 well‐
funded	and	well‐resourced;	others	 are	not,	which	affects	 their	 ability	 to	 complete	 the	
work	effectively	and	consistently:	
	
‘You	go	and	see	Coroners	in	some	other	parts	of	the	country	and	they’re	working	out	of	the	back	
kitchen,	 they’re	working	 out	 of	 a	 Portacabin	…	 there	was	 one	 Coroner	 starting	 to	 hold	 an	
inquest,	could	only	have	the	village	hall	 for	the	day,	had	to	move	to	the	next	town	to	actually	
conclude	the	inquest.’		Coroner	3	
	 	
While	 these	 are	 interesting	 and	 relevant	 in	 their	 own	 right,	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	
paper,	one	final	reason	why	there	appears	to	be	significant	slippage	between	Coroners	
over	 findings	of	 suicide	 is	perhaps	more	 important,	 and	more	 telling,	 than	 the	others.		
That	is,	there	appears	to	be	a	difference	of	opinion	over	the	central	role	of	the	Coroner;	
some	Coroners	 take	a	 fairly	hard	 line	over	 their	determinations—understanding	 their	
role	 as	 fundamentally	 administrative—while	 others	 see	 their	 role	 in	 a	more	 pastoral	
light,	pertaining	first	and	foremost	to	helping	the	grieving	family.		
	
‘I’m	not	a	social	service.		I’m	supposed	to	be	making	an	inquiry	on	behalf	of	the	State,	not	on	
behalf	of	the	family,	and	if	this	person	has	taken	their	own	life,	and	the	evidence	satisfies	me	
beyond	a	 reasonable	doubt	 that	 this	 is	 the	case,	what	verdict	 can	 I	possibly	come	 to	other	
that	that	they	have	taken	their	own	life?’		Coroner	6	
	
Which	can	be	directly	contrasted	with:	
	
‘I	 often	 engage	 the	 family	 and	will	 say,	 ‘I’m	 thinking	 along	 these	 lines.	 	What’s	 your	 view?’	
Sometimes	 if	you	carry	the	 families	with	you,	 it’s	more	cathartic—it’s	totally	wrong,	but	 it’s	a	
more	cathartic	experience	for	them	…	you	put	the	family	at	the	heart	of	the	inquiry.’			Coroner	4		
	
‘It’s	all	about	enabling	people	to	get	on	with	their	 lives	…	giving	them	closure,	actually	 lifting	
them	up	and	explaining	things	…	it’s	not	what	the	law	tells	us	it’s	about,	but	that’s	the	reality	of	
what	it	should	do	…’		Coroner	3	
	
Underestimating	rates	of	suicide	
The	second	issue	to	emerge	from	the	interviews	involves	the	general	admission	by	the	
Coroners	that	the	Coronial	inquest	process	acts	to	depress	suicide	rates,	an		observation	
supported	by	most	research	in	the	area	(Harrison	et	al.,	2009;	Walker	et	al.,	2008).		The	
Coroners	 note	 that	 the	 standard	 of	 proof	 is	 at	 the	 very	 highest	 end	 of	 ‘beyond	
reasonable	 doubt’.	 	 That	 is,	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘beyond	 reasonable	 doubt’	 is	 not	 a	 singular	
measure;	it	is	a	continuum,	with	the	finding	of	suicide	placed	at	the	furthest	end.		
	
‘The	 standard	 of	 proof	 of	 beyond	 a	 reasonable	 doubt	 as	 applied	 in	 the	 public	 prosecution	
services	is	quite	a	lot	lower	really	…	I	doubt	many	people	would	be	prosecuted	if	you	needed	
the	level	of	sureness	you	need	for	a	suicide	verdict	…	Don’t	misunderstand	that	there’s	only	
one	standard	of	proof,	which	is	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt,	but	then	of	course	it’s	up	to	you	
to	interpret	what’s	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt.’		Coroner	1	
	
Consequently,	 findings	 of	 suicide	 can	 be	 relatively	 hard	 to	 attain,	 which	 means	 that	
many	 suicides	 are	 classified	 as	 something	 else—even	when	most	 impartial	 observers	
might	have	reasonably	concluded	otherwise.	 	 	This	results	in	a	significant	reduction	in	
the	numbers	of	suicides	recorded	each	year.		
	
‘Every	 Coroner	 does	 things	 differently,	 and	 like	 I	 say,	 a	 rough	 rule	 of	 thumb—if	 you’re	
looking	at	 statistics,	 I	 can	guarantee	 that	 suicide	 is	under‐represented.	 	Roughly,	 I	 say	you	
could	add	a	third	onto	the	figure	…’		Coroner	4	
	
‘We’re	left	with	about	300	cases	a	year	which	we	inquest	…	I	would	say	we	do	50	suicides	a	
year	out	of	300—genuine	suicide	verdicts.	 	Then	there	are	probably	about	another	30	odd,	
which	probably	are.’		Coroner	1	
	
Family	pressure	and	the	‘therapeutic’	Coroner	
The	 third	 issue	 emerging	 from	 the	 interviews	 explains,	 at	 least	 in	 part,	 why	 many	
Coroners	appear	reluctant	to	reach	a	finding	of	suicide.		Historically,	the	desperation	of	
the	family	not	to	have	a	suicide	finding	by	the	coroner	is	perfectly	understandable:		
	
‘If	you	go	back	in	English	law	150	years	or	so,	suicide	was	an	absolutely	dreadful	thing	to	do	
to	yourself.	 	You	were	cheating	on	God;	you	would	not	have	any	hope	of	resurrection	…	At	
that	 stage	 Coroners	 had	 been	 giving	 burial	 orders	 which	 said	 that	 the	 deceased	 must	 be	
buried	at	the	junction	of	four	roads	with	a	stake	through	their	body—and	no,	I’m	not	getting	
mixed	up	with	Transylvania	here,	this	is	really	what	it	said—where	beggars	could	spit	upon	
their	graves	as	they	went	past.’			Coroner	5	
	
While	 some	 Coroners	 profess	 relative	 immunity	 to	 the	 wishes	 of	 family	 members,	
others	 are	 aware	 that	 such	 wishes	 often	 factor	 into	 their	 overall	 decision‐making	
process.		
	
‘I	 think	a	 lot	of	Coroners—me	included—sometimes	take	a	sympathetic	view	of	 the	 family,	
and	perhaps,	well,	 you	know	…	why	 leave	 the	 family	with	 the	stigma	of	 this,	when	we	can	
actually	make	their	situation	better?	…	So,	I	think	Coroners,	to	some	extent,	are	softies,	and	
might	not	necessarily	bite	the	bullet	and	say,	yes,	this	is	suicide.’		Coroner	4	
	
‘They	 tend	 to	 come	 in	 numbers.	 	 If	 you’ve	 got	 10	members	 of	 the	 family	 with	 their	 eyes	
burning	on	you,	and	they	really	don’t	want	that	verdict,	it	is	very,	very	hard	…’		Coroner	4	
	
This	can	be	contrasted	with	the	standard	stated	approach:				
	
A	Coroner	has	to	divorce	his	own	sensibilities	from	his	legal	responsibilities.’		Coroner	5	
	
‘It	boils	down	to	evidence	as	far	as	I’m	concerned.	 	It	boils	down	to	evidence,	and	if	there’s	
doubt	…	I	wouldn’t	be	persuaded	just	because	they’re	all	shouting	[the	family]	…	I’m	afraid	
you’ve	just	got	to	be	robust	about	it	and	stick	by	your	guns.’		Coroner	2	
	
Clearly,	there	is	a	division	here	between	those	Coroners	who	see	their	principal	task	as	
providing	comfort	and	closure	to	grieving	families,	and	those	for	whom	the	job	remains	
steadfastly	 administrative.	 	 Interestingly,	 this	 tension	 may	 well	 be	 relatively	 new,	 as	
there	 is	 little	 sign	 of	 it	 in	 Burney’s	 excellent	 book	mentioned	 earlier,	 on	 the	 English	
Coronial	 inquest	during	 the	 late	nineteenth	and	early	 twentieth	 centuries.	 	What	may	
have	happened	here	are	 the	effects	of	what	Freckelton	(2008,	p.	576)	refers	 to	as	 the	
rise	 of	 ‘therapeutic	 jurisprudence’—defined	 as	 ‘the	 study	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 law	 as	 a	
therapeutic	agent’.			
	
Within	 this	 approach,	 the	 law	 is	 not	 simply	 a	 set	 of	 codes	 to	 be	 followed	 without	
reflection,	much	 in	 the	manner	of	Legal	Positivism;	such	codes	have	consequences	 for	
all	those	caught	up	in	the	proceedings.		As	such,	our	legal	institutions,	and	those	charged	
with	making	 them	work,	 are	now	deemed	 to	have	 some	 responsibility	 for	 the	mental	
and	emotional	wellbeing	of	all	participants.		King	(2008,	p.	4)	is	quite	explicit	in	his	call	
for	an	increasingly	therapeutic	approach	to	Coronial	practice:	
	
Coroners’	 work	 is	 intimately	 connected	 with	 well‐being—a	 concern	 of	 therapeutic	
jurisprudence.	 	Part	of	 the	Coroner’s	 role	 is	 to	determine	whether	 there	are	public	health	or	
safety	issues	arising	out	of	the	death	and	whether	any	action	needs	to	be	taken	to	remedy	any	
problems,	 particularly	 those	 	 that	may	 cause	 future	 deaths	…	Moreover,	 the	 dead	 person’s	
family	suffer	grief	and,	depending	upon	circumstances	of	the	death,	significant	trauma.	
	
Coroners	vs.	statisticians	
Such	‘therapeutic’	concern	for	the	wellbeing	of	the	grieving	family	leads	on	to	the	fourth	
and	 final	 issue	 emerging	 from	 the	 interviews.	 	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 Coroners	 feel	 under	 no	
obligation	 to	 make	 their	 findings	 amenable	 to	 the	 production	 of	 accurate	 and	 useful	
suicide	statistics.		As	can	be	seen,	most	see	their	task	as	a	fundamentally	administrative	
function	 concerning	 the	management	 of	 particular	 kinds	 of	 death,	 as	 well	 as	 helping	
families	deal	with	the	passing	of	a	loved	one.	 	They	do	not	see	their	job	as	making	life	
easy	 for	 those	 charged	 with	 turning	 such	 deaths	 into	 meaningful	 numbers,	 and	 by	
adopting	 this	 approach,	 Coroner’s	 become—consciously	 or	 otherwise—the	 principal	
gatekeepers	of	our	suicide	statistics.						
	
‘The	statisticians	will	try	and	drill	down,	and	sometimes	we’ll	get	psychological	surveys	of	my	
files	…	 they	 go	 through	 and	 the	 try	 and	 figure	 out	what	 the	 file	means	 so	 they	 get	 the	 true	
suicide	picture.		So	I	said;	‘Hang	on	a	second;	I	sit	in	court,	I’ve	heard	the	evidence,	I’ve	made	a	
judgment	on	what’s	happening	here,	and	you	want	to	go	through	the	same	material	 to	see	 if	
you	come	to	the	same	judgment	or	a	different	judgment?		They	said	‘Yeah’.		‘That’s	fine,’	I	said,	
‘what	you’re	doing	is	meaningless,	but	just	do	it	if	you	want	to.’’		Coroner	3	
	
‘We’ve	now	introduced	narrative	verdicts	which	are	here	to	stay	as	far	as	I’m	concerned,	and	
are	 a	 huge	 boon	 for	 the	 public,	 and	 a	 huge	 benefit	 to	 the	 Coroner’	 court.	 	 So	 I’m	 not	 very	
sympathetic	 to	 somebody	 coming	 along	 and	 saying:	 ‘well,	 you’re	 disturbing	 our	 statistics’.’		
Coroner	6	
	
Those	 Coroners	 who	 place	 greater	 emphasis	 upon	 the	 non‐governmental,	 non‐
administrative	elements	of	their	job—that	is,	who	emphasise	more	pastoral,	therapeutic	
approaches	to	running	an	inquest—appear	to	have	even	less	concern	for	the	difficulties	
faced	by	those	coding	statistical	data	for	later	interpretation:			
	
‘You	know,	I	do	the	job	as	I	think	fit,	and	by	trying	to	put	families	first.		I	think	I’m	as	guilty	as	
anyone	sometimes	of	being	a	softy.	 	 I	appreciate	 that	 it	must	rankle	statisticians	completely,	
but	 in	 terms	 of	 perhaps	 the	 way	 people	 can	 live	 with	 themselves	 thereafter,	 I	 think	 that	
probably	is	a	better	aim.’		Coroner	4	
	
‘You	can	make	a	difference	because	one	of	the	non‐statutory	functions	which	is	not	recorded	
anywhere	 but	 a	 lot	 of	 us	 do	 it,	 is	 to	 try	 and	 help	 the	 family	 in	 closure,	 without	 being	
paternalistic.		It	can	be	a	cathartic	exercise	and	to	that	extent	I	think	you’ve	justified	your	own	
existence,	never	mind	the	State’s	work	which	you	do.’		Coroner	5	
	
This	 relative	 disregard	 for	 the	 governmental	 aspects	 of	 the	 Coronial	 role—
governmental	in	a	Foucaultian	(1977)	sense	of	the	word,	the	effective	sketching	out	of	
the	 contours	 of	 community	 life;	 numbers	 and	 types	 of	 deaths	 being	 a	 very	 important	
contour—raises	questions	about	just	what	Coroners’	principal	functions	ought	to	be.		If	
the	 statistics	 their	 actions	 give	 rise	 to	 bear	 only	 a	 passing	 resemblance	 to	 any	
reasonable	 ontology	 of	 suicide,	 perhaps	 that	 governmental	 responsibility	 should	 be	
dealt	with	elsewhere.			
	
Or	perhaps	 it	 raises	questions	about	which	elements	of	 governance	Coroners	actually	
contribute	to.	 	Rather	than	simply	managing	the	data	of	death,	do	Coroners	now	form	
part	of	 the	governance	of	 subjective	 experience?	 	 	That	 is,	 particularly	on	 the	 issue	of	
suicide,	are	they	are	now	a	component	of	the	administrative	apparatus	that	manages	the	
emotional	 wellbeing	 of	 the	 population?	 	 Rose	 (1990)	 refers	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 a	
‘therapeutic	community’;	it	may	well	be	that	Coroners	have	allocated	themselves	a	role	
within	that.								
	
That	said,	it	is	important	to	avoid	describing	a	binary,	where	none	necessarily	exists.		In	
his	book	on	education,	Hunter	(1994)	notes	that	attempts	to	ascribe	simple,	two‐sided	
logics	 to	 the	 fabric	of	 the	modern	school,	 ignore	 the	complex	relationship	between	 its	
bureaucratic	 components,	 and	 it’s	 long	 history	 of	 pastoral	 guidance.	 	 The	 English	
Coronial	 inquest	 appears	 to	 have	 an	 equally	 complex	 relationship	 between	 its	
bureaucratic	 and	 pastoral	 functions,	 a	 relationship	 that	 has	 yet	 to	 be	 fully,	 or	 even	
partially,	resolved.						
	
Conclusion	
	
This	study	leads	to	three	central	observations:	first,	given	the	evidence	assembled	here,	
if	 the	British	 inquest	 is	any	measure	of	 the	 idiosyncratic	and	 locally‐organized	way	 in	
which	potential	suicides	are	addressed	and	adjudicated	upon,	then	comparative	suicide	
statistics	 (both	 local	 and	 international)	 are,	 at	 best,	 problematic,	 at	 worst,	 all	 but	
meaningless.	
	
Second,	 while	 the	 UK	 Coroners	 expressed	 near	 unanimous	 support	 for	 the	 stringent	
standard	 of	 proof	 required	 (in	 spite	 of	 the	 statistical	 inaccuracies	 this	most	 certainly	
produces),	and	unanimous	support	for	the	continued	existence	of	a	compulsory	inquest	
for	 all	 potential	 deaths	 by	 suicide,	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 few	 advantages	 in	 Australia	
adopting	the	same	protocols	and	procedures.		The	only	argument	that	could	run	counter	
to	this	would	involve	a	greater	emphasis	upon	therapeutic	models	of	Coronial	practice,	
which	would	 lean	 towards	 emphasizing	 the	 benefits	 of	 suicide	 inquests	 in	 aiding	 the	
grieving	process	of	bereaved	families.		Given	the	problems	outlined	above,	and	given	we	
have	no	historical	expectation	of	an	 inquest,	 let	alone	 the	high	costs	 involved	and	 the	
extra	workload	placed	upon	our	already	taxed	Coroners,	this	seems	highly	unlikely.								
	
Finally,	the	important	question	arises:	what	is	the	principal	role	of	the	inquest	in	suicide	
investigations?	 	 There	 seems	 to	 be	 little	 agreement	 among	 the	 English	 coroners	
interviewed.	 	 While	 most	 understand	 and	 accept	 their	 role	 within	 the	 governmental	
regulation	of	death,	 this	often	seemed	secondary	to	their	 less	tangible	pastoral	role	 in	
helping	the	families	deal	with	bereavement.	 		The	disagreement	and	relative	confusion	
over	their	responsibilities	may	eventually	need	formal	clarification.			
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